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INTRODUCTION
Free speech has evolved into a highly complicated body of law. At the
advent of the Supreme Court's entry into Free Speech jurisprudence, start-
ing in the early twentieth century,' speech was measured according to a two-
level theory: speech was either protected (attaining status as a free speech
right) or not protected (not meriting status as a free speech right).2 Under the
two-level theory articulated prominently in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
speech was protected unless it fell within one of those "certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."3 These
exceptions included "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Copyright Edward
J. Eberle, 2011. All rights reserved. I would like to thank Kim Baker, Dan Berman, Courtney
Cahill, Brian Foley, Jared Goldstein, Keith Hylton, Gary Lawson, Abby Moncrieff, Colleen
Murphy, David Nersesian, and Keith Outterson, all of whom participated in the Roger Wil-
liams workshop and the Boston University workshop, for their valuable comments on this
Article and Jon Entin and Ron Krotoszynski.
I. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919), with Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
3. Id. at 571-72; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscen-
ity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10 (articulating two-level theory).
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the insulting or 'fighting' words."4 With the Court's reevaluation of Free
Speech jurisprudence in the second half of the twentieth century, however,
most of the exceptions noted in Chaplinsky have been reconfigured, with
most now meriting some constitutional protection.' Of the exceptions men-
tioned in Chaplinsky, only obscenity6 and fighting words7 remain wholly
unprotected categories of speech, subject to the Court's narrowing of their
definitions.
The explanation for this change in the state of law is the Court's
recognition of Free Speech as a fundamental right (Free Speech being the
vanguard of the twentieth century fundamental rights project),8 and its prior-
itization of Free Speech as the most prized of these rights.9 With its prioriti-
zation of Free Speech, the Court has reevaluated how it views acts of com-
munication, concentrating fundamentally on whether the act possesses
communicative qualities. Consideration of the value of the communication
is the first priority. Upon assessing the value of the communicative act, the
next topic for consideration is the form and type of conduct at issue: does it
present clear and concrete harm-speech that has a likelihood of gestating
into conduct that can present danger to a person, the social order, or the
4. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S at 572.
5. For reevaluation of "the lewd and obscene," see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484, 489 (1957) (holding obscenity unprotected and specifying the test to be "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973) (rejecting the Roth standard and imposing a narrower, three-part test). For recon-
sideration of "the profane," see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1975) (holding ordinance prohibiting outdoor exhibition of films containing nudity
overinclusive); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing disturbing the peace
conviction based on defendant's wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the
Draft" because doing so was "speech" rather than "offensive conduct"). For an illustration of
change with respect to "the libelous," see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964). For reevaluation of "insulting or 'fighting' words," see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 20.
6. Under Miller, obscenity must meet these guidelines:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
7. Under Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20, fighting words are "those personally abusive
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."
8. Free Speech was the first civil right to be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and made applicable to the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
9. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (Free Speech trumps
Equal Protection).
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society? I will refer to this as the baggage associated with the act. Stated a
different way, if the act contains communicative qualities, it constitutes Free
Speech, and then the Court can move to the next question as to how to bal-
ance the value of speech against the baggage implicated by nonspeech com-
ponents. The baggage might be characterized as the social cost to society.
The ever expanding range of communicative matter grouped within
the circumference of the First Amendment carries with it its own "innate
tensions, contradictions, and ambiguities"-matters arising from the rela-
tionship of the communicative matter to social reality that must be assessed
and then sorted out.'" These tensions "pose great challenges to the substance
and stability of the First Amendment."" How is fringe speech-speech
barely within the zone of constitutional protection, like pornography or se-
curities speech-to be treated in relation to core speech (such as political,
religious, artistic, or scientific speech)? Can these different categories of
speech be adequately defined and their range delineated? Assuming the
difficult, if not quixotic, task of precise definition of categories can be ac-
complished, can the varying levels of protection accorded different catego-
nes of speech be distinguished from one another so that the First Amend-
ment has coherence and stability? One danger is that of doctrinal "dilution
. ..by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee."' 2
Under doctrinal dilution, core areas of speech might be judged by levels of
protection afforded intermediate or low-ranked categories of speech. An
example would be where the rule of intermediate scrutiny applicable to
commercial speech would then be applied to political speech, which merits
strict scrutiny. The process can also work the other way: lower valued cate-
gories of speech could be leveled up to rules of protection appropriate to
higher-valued categories. An example would be in R.A. V v. St. Paul, where
the Court applied the rule of strict scrutiny to an unprotected category of
speech: fighting words."
These are problems in the architecture of First Amendment Free
Speech jurisprudence. There is a need for a coherent structure to Free
Speech law that can provide a sound foundation to judge and settle the is-
sues of Free Speech. An important part of the foundation is the articulation
of clear definitions of the types of speech and the applicable rules that can
demarcate the differently valued categories of speech and, then, assign them
the appropriate level of protection. The two-level protection (protected and
unprotected) theory of speech articulated in Chaplinsky has been replaced
by what is now a four-level theory of speech: high, intermediate, low (all of
10. Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech and Public Discourse in Amer-
ica, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1135, 1151 (1994) [hereinafter Eberle, WT].
11. Id.
12. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
13. 505 U.S. 377.
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which are considered protected speech), and minimally valued speech
(which is characterized as unprotected speech). This is an inevitable conse-
quence of the Court's expansion of the range of communicative matter in-
cluded within the First Amendment. But with expansion of the Amendment
comes the need for coherence in the structure and methodology of Free
Speech. And that states the purpose of this Article: assessing, fashioning,
and stabilizing the architecture of the First Amendment in order to lend co-
herence to Free Speech jurisprudence. 4
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the methodology of
Free Speech analysis. Free Speech is presumptively protected absent clear
demonstration of concrete harm independent from the speech. This is so as a
matter of constitutional text and prioritization of liberty, which structurally
operates as the default rule, empowering people so that they may influence
the tenor of the democracy and the culture. Part II describes why we must
bring coherence to Free Speech law in order to protect it from the onslaught
of the inevitable tensions that arise in the contest between the value of
speech and the value of the legal measure. Part III sets forth the rules that
should comprise the architecture of the First Amendment. We must deter-
mine how to value and order speech once it is determined it merits protec-
tion under the First Amendment. The value of speech must be justified, first,
by its intrinsic or instrumental worth and, second, by its relation to conduct
or harm as measured by a speech/conduct dichotomy.
Free Speech should then be ordered as follows. High valued or core
speech should be accorded the highest level of protection under the most
exacting scrutiny, conventionally phrased as strict scrutiny analysis. Under
strict scrutiny analysis, government must justify its regulation as "necessary
to serve a compelling state interest [that] is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end."' 5 The existing structure of strict scrutiny analysis remains effective in
safeguarding the core of freedom of expression. Intermediate valued speech
should be accorded heightened scrutiny as well, but less probing than strict
scrutiny; intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. Under intermediate scrutiny,
government must prove that the end is substantial and the means are sub-
stantially related to the end. 6 The existing intermediate scrutiny standard
must be revised so that the application of substantiality is tightened so that
the proportionality of ends to means is a much closer fit (that is, substantial
or important) and not a loose connection (such as rational or plausible). Low
14. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 393 (2009) ("First Amendment doctrine is a complicated
and occasionally illegible map of sometimes-overlapping categories, which are joined and in
many areas simply painted over by balancing approaches.").
15. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
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valued speech should be reconfigured to be judged on a new test, a general
balancing of interest test. Under a general balancing of interest test, it is
necessary to judge the value of the speech versus the value of the govern-
mental interest in order to determine which is weightier. And minimally
valued speech, which lies outside the First Amendment, should merit mini-
mal level rational basis review. Under this test of rational basis review, gov-
ernment must at least demonstrate a plausible, rational reason for the regula-
tion of speech.' Short of government proving a rational basis for regulating
the speech, the speech should be protected. While the speech at issue in the
fourth level possesses communicative quality, it will almost always be out-
weighed by the concrete harm the speech presents.
These three levels of protection (high, intermediate, and low value
speech) function as safe harbors for speech. But since determination of what
is speech or not speech can be difficult and confusing, it is also necessary to
have a default rule in place. As a default rule, I propose that the expression
should be protected as speech unless government can show that the value of
the legal measure outweighs the value of the speech. Speech is critical to
individual self-fulfillment and democratic self-government. Of all rights,
freedom of speech is most crucial to the American society because expres-
sion is critical to the development of human personality and human society.
Thus, speech should be protected unless there is a clear demonstration of
concrete harm; specifically imminent, serious, and clear action likely to
incite violence. 
8
Reassessing, revising, establishing, and maintaining the architecture of
the First Amendment is crucial to the Free Speech project in order to bring
coherence and predictability to this fundamental right. But, of course, we
must also recognize that the strength of the architecture depends on the sta-
17. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955):
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctri-
naire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and propor-
tions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the
Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. We can-
not say that the point has been reached here. (citations omitted).
The key case for standards of review is United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.:
Even in the absence of such aids, the existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commer-
cial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis .... [T]he question is at least de-
batable whether commerce in filled milk should be left unregulated.
304 U.S. 144, 152, 154(1938).
18. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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bility of the foundation; the foundation must be solid and able to deal with
the fluidity of changing socio-economic dynamics. This architecture, as any
architecture, must be situated to withstand the pressures of social forces and
be able to adjust to the times-just as a house must depend on the stability
of its foundation in order to weather the forces of nature.
I. FREE SPEECH AS A PREFERRED VALUE
Free Speech is properly one of the seminal values of the American
constitutional order. This is so as a matter of constitutional text, the auton-
omy of the individual, and the promotion of democracy, among other rea-
sons. "The textual mandate of the Free Speech Clause, providing that 'Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech," 9 reasonably
yields an absolutist orientation."2 No textual limitation of speech is present
in the Constitution. The absolutist orientation of the Free Speech Clause
contrasts with the circumscription of communication freedoms typical of
European constitutions.2' Text matters; especially given the sparsely worded
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In this Article, I only consider the Free Speech Clause.
20. Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 958 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 1) [hereinafter Eberle, ASU].
Justice Black captured the sense of the amendment about right: "The phrase 'Congress shall
make no law' is composed of plain words, easily understood .... [T]he language . . .[is]
absolute." Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960). Justice
Black generally wants an absolutist approach to interpretation of free speech. But he is not
totally an absolutist. For example, in his dissent in Cohen v. California, he determined that
wearing a jacket with the words, "Fuck the Draft," was conduct, and only minor speech. 403
U.S. 15, 27, 28 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, June 1, 2010:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without in-
terference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not pre-
vent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema en-
terprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
See also GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. V (Ger.):
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions
in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from gen-
erally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means
of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
1196 Vol. 2011:1191
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U.S. Constitution,22 which contrasts with the greater length of most Europe-
an constitutions.2 ' The placement of speech as an enumerated right without
limitation in the Constitution structurally suggests that protection of speech
is presumptively favored.
It is also true, of course, that Free Speech has never been interpreted to
protect absolutely all expression, with justification.24 In certain instances,
speech must be regulated in order to prevent clear, present, serious, and
imminent harm to people or society or when it violates the rights of others. 5
Still, Free Speech is one of the essential natural rights on which the U.S.
constitutional order is founded.26 In this respect, the Free Speech Clause
preserves the autonomy of a person as it protects and preserves the capacity
of a person to control her thought process and engage in expression accord-
ing to her motivations.27 Free Speech is also fundamental because free
thought and dissemination of ideas is crucial to the formation and facilita-
tion of democracy and the culture.28
Given its place as a preferred fundamental right, we must turn to the
question of determining the scope of Free Speech rights. To do this, we
must define speech. The definition of speech turns on whether the act under
review possesses communicative qualities. Speech is expression, the com-
munication of information about something, such as ideas, commercial
products, defamation, political or religious views.29 To be protected consti-
tutionally, the act must possess sufficient communicative qualities.3 Inevi-
tably, what quantum of communicative material must be present to merit
constitutional protection is an exercise of judgment.3 Relevant to a determi-
(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provi-
sions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.
(3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teach-
ing shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect .... ).
23. For example, the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) is eighty-three pages long
in its 1991 official version pocket book form.
24. Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at 959.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 961.
27. Id. at 959.
28. For extended discussion of this, see id. at 959-61.
29. Id. at 964.
30. Id.
31. Judicial decision making is, at bottom, a process of "reasoned judgment," as the
Court explained in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plu-
rality).
At its best, judicial reasoning is a form of pragmatic reasoning, entailing careful
deduction from general standards to specific cases; paying attention to history, tra-
dition and context, being skeptical of rigid dichotomies; exhibiting faith in dia-
1197
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nation of constitutional protection is whether the communicative qualities
present are related to the principles that justify treatment of speech as pro-
tected under the First Amendment-justifications like pursuit of knowledge,
self-expression, or self-government. 32
One way in which the Court has framed the relevant inquiry is: "In
deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether
'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether]
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it."' 33 The Court's focus on the communicative act, both from
the standpoint of the speaker and the listener, is a sound way to frame the
inquiry into speech. Perhaps a better way to judge whether the act at issue
merits free speech protection is to ask simply whether it merits sufficient
communicative qualities, regardless of content. For example, while intellec-
tual, artistic, or entertainment qualities can be important, emotional, irra-
tional, or internal thought processes are also noteworthy. What is relevant
for the inquiry should be whether the act possesses sufficient "communica-
tive qualities." The speaker and the listener will themselves determine what
are relevant communicative qualities for their purposes. The role of the
courts is simply to judge, as a matter of law, whether the communicative
qualities, of whatever sort, are adequate for First Amendment purposes to
merit protection.
The qualities of communication satisfactory for First Amendment pur-
poses should be considered broad, as broad as speakers and listeners deter-
mine. After all, Free Speech is a protected zone of freedom, and it is up to
people to determine the domain of Free Speech, not government. Free
Speech can partake of rational components of the human condition, such as
over politics, science, literature, or academics. Free speech can as well par-
take of irrational domains of human existence, such as over religion, art,
emotion, sense, or feelings. Since Free Speech is, at bottom, a reflection of
the human condition in all of its dimensions, it is as varied as the human
condition and should be protected in accordance with its variety. Justice
Harlan well spoke to this element of the First Amendment:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
logue and deliberation; and appreciating the human component of decision-
making.
Edward J. Eberle, The Right to Information Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965,
1011 (2001) (citing Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm,
42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411,425-28 (1992)).
32. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts,
34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 276, 290-91 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories].
33. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
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pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emo-
tive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard
for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more im-
portant element of the overall message sought to be communicated.34
Likewise, the medium of communication can be varied-consisting of
standard forms of communication, like speaking, writing, or reading. But
communication can consist of more unorthodox mediums too, like conduct,
symbols, pictures, or silence. Or communication can be external (such as
speaking, singing, writing, or painting) or internal (such as thought, sense,
silence, or reading).35 Again, what is relevant, simply, is that the behavior in
question possesses sufficient communicative qualities.36 The speaker and the
listener will determine the nature and form of expression.
Here too, the Court, appropriately, has demonstrated how to meticu-
lously evaluate behavior so that all possible communicative value may be
gleaned. R.A. V. v. City of St. PauP7 is a good example of this approach.
Here, the Court evaluated actions involving the erection and placement of a
cross assembled from the parts of a broken chair and then carried into a
neighbor's yard and set aflame to determine what was speech and what was
conduct.38 The Court scrutinized the actions element by element, and not as
undifferentiated wholes, to determine whether and which elements merited
First Amendment protection and which did not.39 The focus of the Court's
inquiry was whether the element under review possessed sufficient commu-
nicative qualities. ° The Court determined that the burning of the construct-
ed cross possessed sufficient communicative qualities as a message of
hate.4' Constitutionality hinged on the motives of government: did govern-
ment act based on speech (which is presumptively unconstitutional) or con-
duct (which is the proper domain of government). 2 In R.A. V., there were
both speech elements (hate speech) and conduct elements (trespass, arson,
34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); see also Bery v. City of New
York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[W]ritten and visual expression do not always allow for
neat separation: words may form part of a work of art, and images may convey messages and
stories.... Visual artwork is as much an embodiment of the artist's expression as is a written
text, and the two cannot always be readily distinguished.").
35. Judge Posner has spoken to music as a free speech component. See Miller v.
Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) ("[E]ven
if 'thought,' 'concept,' 'idea,' and 'opinion' are broadly defined, these are not what most
music conveys; and even if music is regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding
ideas and opinions.").
36. Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at 964.
37. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
38. Id. at 379.
39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 393-94.
41. Id. at 393.
42. Id. at 382-84.
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and threat). In R.A. V., the Court determined that the City of St. Paul acted
on speech motives in applying a content-discriminatory fighting words or-
dinance, which the Court found unconstitutional.43 The Court's approach of
micro-evaluating actions element by element for sufficient expressive prop-
erties is a sound methodology for approaching Free Speech questions.
Speech qualities must be assessed quite carefully to squeeze out whatever
value can be obtained so that people can have at their disposal as much in-
formation as possible to help assist them in self-determining the course of
their lives to the greatest extent possible. Such a broad approach will pre-
sumptively favor speech, which is a core ingredient to the complexion of
human personality and society.
R.A. V. is illustrative of the Court's quest over the last fifty years to
broaden the domain of protected speech under the First Amendment. R.A. V
is one of the more extreme examples of this broadening enterprise of the
Court. After all, the speech under review (fighting words) has been an un-
protected category of speech since its inception in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire." Nevertheless, the Court applied an exacting form of strict
scrutiny to the fighting words under review because it found the fighting
words ordinance to be content-based and, worse, viewpoint-based.45 R.A. V.
is also illustrative of a second major enterprise of the Court with respect to
the Free Speech project initiated by the Warren Court in the 1960s: "nar-
row[ing] [of] the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions,"46 as meas-
ured against the baseline of the 1942 world of Chaplinsky.
In broadening the scope of protected Free Speech, the Court has ac-
corded constitutional protection to these previously unprotected categories
of speech: commercial speech, 7 lewd or profane speech,48 and offensive
speech. 9 The Court has also reconsidered the range of previously unprotect-
ed categories of speech and accorded certain constitutional protection to
43. Id. at 396. For extended discussion of this view of R.A.V., see Eberle, WF, supra
note 10, at 1152-54. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, char-
acterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swas-
tika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MiNN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
44. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
45. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393-96. For evaluation of these aspects of R.A.V., see Eberle,
WF, supra note 10, at 1142-43, 1154-58.
46. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383.
47. Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia, 425 U.S. 748 , 770 (1976) (hold-
ing commercial speech protected), with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942)
(holding commercial speech unprotected).
48. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 205-06 (1975).
49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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them, including pornography," libel,5' and incitement to violence. 2 The
Court has also recognized new forms of protected speech, including flag
burning,53 internet speech,54 nude dancing,55 and, most recently, videos of
dog fighting.56 The enterprise of broadening the reach of the First Amend-
ment reflects a commitment to enlarging the channels of communication as
much as possible so that people may have as much information as possible
to self-govern their lives. 7 This is in line with the constitutional commit-
ment to limitation of government as a structural way to empower personal
liberty. In the area of Free Speech, this is a matter of fundamental rights.
In keeping with its mission to enlarge the scope of the First Amend-
ment, the Court has also actively narrowed the range of traditional catego-
ries of unprotected speech. Notable topics of this narrowing exercise include
fighting words," libel,59 and obscenity.' With Virginia v. Black, the Court
clarified the unprotected category of threats by labeling it true threats.6' The
apex of this movement, in recent time, is R.A. V., where the Court recon-
ceived the idea of unprotected categories of speech.
[S]tatements [concerning unprotected categories] must be taken in context, howev-
er, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand char-
50. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 492-93 (1957) (holding adult speech is protected unless meets definition of obscenity).
51. NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (determining that de-
famatory speech directed against public people was protected unless it meets the definition of
actual malice).
52. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding all advocacy protected
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action").
53. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 420 (1989); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
54. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
55. Barnes v. Glenn Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
56. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584, 1592 (2010).
57. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) ("Freedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which infor-
mation is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period.").
58. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("'[F]ighting words' [are] those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.") (redefining test for
fighting words set out in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1941)).
59. NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (redrawing notions of libel
and defamatory speech that are unprotected; for public people, libel directed against them is
protected unless it meets the definition of actual malice).
60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 487-88 (1957) (narrowing definition of proscribable obscenity).
61. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). Threats were first recognized in
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam) and then later clarified
constitutionally by the Court in Black, 538 U.S. at 358-60 (citations omitted).
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acterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all." What [the Court] mean[s] is that
these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated be-
cause of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-
not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that
they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinc-
tively proscribable content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government .... It is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de minimis"
expressive content or that their content is in all respects "worthless and undeserv-
ing of constitutional protection"; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed.62
Relevant to an action, simply, is whether it possesses communicative
qualities. If it does in sufficient quantity, the act should be protected under
the First Amendment. A separate inquiry is whether the act also contains
proscribable content. If there is sufficient illegal or harmful conduct, the
speech can be regulated. Under this methodology, acts must be viewed mi-
croscopically, element by element, so that protected speech can be separated
from legitimate harms. The broad dichotomy between speech (protected)
and conduct (unprotected) is a useful guide to make this distinction, as dis-
cussed further later.
A final movement toward enlarging the scope of the First Amendment
has been the Court's reluctance to recognize new categories of unprotected
speech. The Court has rejected these candidates of unprotected speech: flag
burning,63 outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress,' vice
and temperance,65 virtual child pornography,66 and, most recently, dog
fighting videos.67 The only category of unprotected speech recognized in
recent times is that of child pornography.68 Child pornography constitutes a
category of unprotected speech because "use of children as subjects of por-
nographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental
health of the child," and because "distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children . "..."69 Child pornography is unprotected speech because
there is a clear demonstration of serious harm that is independent of the
speech.
Together, these three movements-broadening the reach of protected
speech, narrowing the categories of unprotected speech, and presumptively
62. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-85 (citations omitted).
63. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-17 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592-93 (1969).
64. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-17 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988).
65. 44 LiquorMart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513-14 (1996) (plurality).
66. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2002).
67. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
68. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
69. Id. at 758-59.
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rejecting new candidates of unprotected speech-are of a like purpose. They
are all part of the modem Free Speech project of enlarging the scope of the
First Amendment so that members of society have as much information
available as is possible to direct their lives; however, more needs to be done
here. A crucial next project is further enlarging the circumference of the
Amendment. The frontier of this enterprise is likely to lie with respect to
fringe speech-speech that merits protection but is treated as of minimal
value-like pornography and obscenity; workplace speech; video games;
expanded professional communications; and business, corporate, and securi-
ties speech that might fit within the definition of commercial speech.7" Now
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, corpo-
rate speech committed to political campaigns is treated the same as individ-
ual persons engaging in politics, and accorded high protection.7' Citizens
United illustrates the Court's approach of broadening the circumference of
speech. Consideration of speech at the fringe will, no doubt, push the in-
quiry further into resolving the tensions inherent in the interaction of com-
munication with social reality.72 This project will inevitably present chal-
lenges to the coherence of Free Speech law and to our reasoning capabili-
ties.73
For our purposes, the result of the Court's handiwork is that the gen-
eral rule of Free Speech jurisprudence is that Free Speech is presumptively
protected unless government can persuasively prove the presence of a clear
and present harm independent of the speech, as in the case of Ferber's
recognition of child pornography as unprotected speech. Governmental tar-
geting of harm that is purely communicative is presumptively constitutional.
The harm government targets must be noncommunicative harm, such as
child pornography. Identification and isolation of harm from speech is an-
other central focus of the Free Speech project. This approach is the default
rule: speech is protected unless there is clear demonstration of harm.
Many actions contain both communicative and noncommunicative
content. A good example is, again, R.A. V. Cross burning can be communi-
cative (hate) and behavioral (arson, assault, and battery). Resolution of such
mixed speech/conduct acts is not easy and calls for quite careful considera-
tion of the values at issue. A useful rubric to measure acts of asserted com-
munication is the speech (protected)/conduct (unprotected) dichotomy.
Does the action contain sufficient communicative content? For example,
physical behavior like handing out materials on the street, wearing a jacket
70. Eberle, WF, supra note 10, at 1150-51; Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at 969-71.
Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CrN. L. REv. 1181, 1183-85, 1201 n.78 (1988).
71. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
72. Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at 970.
73. Eberle, WF, supra note 10, at 1151.
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with a picture or a word, or burning an object could be protected as speech
if there is a sufficient quantum of communicative content. On the other
hand, walking down the street and wearing a jacket with no message would
be conduct, not speech.74 These determinations will depend on a careful,
pragmatic assessment of the act under the speech/conduct dichotomy. Con-
stitutionally, of course, speech is presumptively off limits to government.
We might consider the guarantee of Free Speech to be an end point of gov-
ernment, that is, a limitation on government power. Free Speech lies in the
hands of the people, whereas regulation of conduct is the proper domain of
government.75
With these modem rules of Free Speech in place, we are left with an-
other challenge: making sense of the complexity of the modem First
Amendment. The Court's expansion of the scope of the Amendment has
brought in more and more communicative content to the domain of Free
Speech, which has raised its own set of problems. How do you value
speech? Is one category of speech to be valued as another? Alternatively,
should varieties of speech be valued differently? If so, how and on what
basis? What rules of law should apply to different ordered speech? These
are just some of the questions that comprise our next topic.
II. THE NEED FOR COHERENCE IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
Enlarging the scope of Free Speech protected within the First
Amendment is a noteworthy enterprise, and a major accomplishment of the
twentieth century Court. But expansion of the Amendment brings its own
set of problems. It is one thing to apply the simple 1942 two-level rule of
Chaplinsky, in which speech is either protected or not. It is quite a bit more
complicated to, first, determine if speech is protected and, second, deter-
mine what level of protection it merits. This is one of the problems we now
face in constructing and stabilizing the architecture of the First Amendment.
Speech, of course, is multivarious. Different forms of speech address
different dimensions of human thought. Political speech speaks to our desire
to affect public policy and the character of the society we live in.76 Religious
speech speaks to the transcendental yearning we experience (or do not expe-
rience) beyond the here-and-now of ordinary existence.77 Academic or sci-
entific speech speaks to our search for pure truth, trying to understand, de-
74. For detailed evaluation of this issue, see Eberle, ASU, supra note 20; Eberle,
WF, supra note 10.
75. Of course, the speech/conduct dichotomy is a largely pragmatic distinction, a
guide to make hard decisions. For consideration of this, see Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at
964-65; Eberle, WF, supra note 10, at 193-94.
76. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1987).
77. Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, II U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 6 (2007-08).
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vise, or reformulate the facts or rules that constitute the paradigms that
comprise the world we live in."8 Commercial speech speaks to basic product
and service information we need to navigate our consumer society.79 And so
on.
All of these forms of speech, and more, justifiably merit protection
under the First Amendment based upon Free Speech justifications, such as
self-government, self-realization, autonomy, or pursuit of truth, to name
some of the panoply of Free Speech rationales. The more complicated ques-
tions posed by the Court's expansion of the First Amendment is how to val-
ue different forms of speech, how to differentiate one form of speech from
another, what rules of law apply to them, and how to make sense of what is
now a complicated First Amendment jurisprudence. These are the questions
at issue in the architecture of the First Amendment. A solid architectural
foundation is critical to lending coherence and stability to the difficult issue
of free speech. If we do not have a solid foundation, then we are left with a
medley, potluck of divergent case law, which will be stirred into the pot and
result in a blended mix of speech issues melding into one another, thereby
creating confusion in the law.
We should think of the First Amendment as consisting of clusters of
communicative content. The clusters are entwined around specific subjects,
such as politics, religion, or commerce. Technically, we can characterize the
clusters as categories of speech. A category demarcates a particular species
of speech, which helps order thinking. Each of the categories consists of
communication of a certain variety. And because speech is of different vari-
eties, it may be valued differently, placed in a series of concentric circles.
We might think of four levels of valuation. First-order speech consists of the
central core of the First Amendment. Core or first-order speech consists of
political, religious, academic, scientific, and artistic speech. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, identified the very center of the First Amendment as
a subspecies of political speech: the ability to engage in "criticism of offi-
cial conduct . . . [is] the central meaning of the First Amendment."8 Se-
cond-order speech consists of commercial speech, labor speech,8' and offen-
78. Id.
79. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
757-61 (1976).
80. 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
81. Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950) ("But while
picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and different. Indus-
trial picketing 'is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irre-
spective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."') (citations omitted); id. at
468 ("compulsive features inherent in picketing"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940). Speech on labor matters is important even if motivated by economic concerns. Nev-
ertheless, one could conclude, as Justice Brennan, that "speech about commercial or econom-
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sive speech, especially of the kind that might violate substantial privacy
interests.82 Second-order speech can be characterized as the circle moving to
the left of the core; a second concentric circle. Third-level speech includes
private speech, including private defamatory speech,83 pornography or
adult-oriented speech, 4 libel directed against private people,85 speech publi-
cizing actions of private citizens implicating privacy interests,86 offensive
speech in restrictive forums,87 and nude dancing.8 Third-level speech can be
ic matters, even if not directly implicating 'the central meaning of the First Amendment,' is
an important part of our public discourse." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749, 787 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82. The leading case here is Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), where the
Court framed the rule: "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner." This rule of Cohen is context, or a time, place, manner restriction, not content-
based regulation. If the regulation is content-based, as the facts in Cohen, then strict scrutiny
seemingly applies. "It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized and com-
pelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter exple-
tive a criminal offense." Id. at 26. In Cohen, of course, the speaker expressed his disgust with
the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket that displayed "Fuck the Draft" on the back. Id at 16.
Thus, this communicative act was politically motivated and plausibly, therefore, constituted
core political speech. Under this analysis, the content of speech was political. What was at
issue was the mode of communication-that is, the use of an epithet to convey the message.
Id. at 24. Accord Erznozick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) ("We hold only that
the present ordinance [regulating films that display nudity] does not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when government attempts to regulate expression."). Of
course, speech that merely offends, without more, might be hard to value as core speech.
Second-level speech would seem a more appropriate category.
83. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759-60 ("In contrast, speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern .... While such speech is not totally
unprotected by the First Amendment its protections are less stringent.") (citations omitted).
84. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(social interest in nonobscene erotic films of lesser importance than interest in political de-
bate).
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest
that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate. ...
Id. at 70.
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1974).
86. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (First
Amendment media right to publicity may have to yield to privacy interest in securing ability
to earn a living); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975).
87. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (radio as restricted medium
justifies greater regulation).
88. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) ("As we explained in
Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we
think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection."); Barnes
v. Glenn Theater Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality opinion). In Erie, the Court
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characterized as the third concentric circle, moving two places to the left of
the core. Fourth-level (unprotected speech) includes categories like obsceni-
ty, 9 actual malice defamation,9" fighting words,9 incitement to violence,92
false facts,93 and child pornography. 94 Fourth-level speech can be character-
ized as outside the circle of free speech protection.
Each of these levels of speech is not fixed. New species of communi-
cation can be valued as meeting any one of the four levels or, even, a new
level. Existing categories of speech can be revalued, higher or lower. The
process of valuation proceeds in conjunction with the flow of social reality.
This is a living, organic process, not a fixed end point. The framework for
Free Speech must be anchored securely, and yet, flexibly, to adapt to the
changes brought about through the dynamics of social-reality.
The problem now posed is how to differentiate these four levels of
speech from one another. Differentiating levels of speech from one another
is crucial to the Free Speech project in order to assure that there is integrity
and coherence to the First Amendment. We do not want the First Amend-
ment to be compromised by random judicial judgments or ad hoc discre-
tionary reasoning. A particular problem to be on guard for is a blending of
differently valued species of speech that might occur by blurring the lines
between differently-valued categories of speech. For example, is money
spent to promote a certain good or service political or social speech or
commercial speech? Merging of categories of differently valued speech
might occur in two ways. One, the rules of lower-valued speech might be
applied to speech that is higher valued. This is the critical problem of doc-
trinal dilution, by which higher valued speech is diminished by the misap-
plication of norms appropriate to lower valued speech.9" We need to guard
against this problem by forming a secure foundation for speech and adher-
ing to the process of stabilizing the foundation.
The process could also go the other way: lower-ranked speech might
be judged by the rules applicable to higher-ranked speech. R.A. V. is an ex-
ample of this: judging fighting words, an unprotected category of speech, by
extended the "secondary effects" analysis applicable to zoning of adult entertainment facili-
ties, as in Young, to nude dancing. 529 U.S. at 289. In essence, the Court applied the less
stringent content-neutral test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), to nude
dancing. The Court's analysis demonstrates the difficulty of making judgments about quali-
ties, varieties, and treatment of species of speech. In fact, the Court's choice to apply the
more lenient standard of O'Brien may have been its way of recognizing the lesser value of
adult speech and nude dancing.
89. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
90. NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-88 (1964).
91. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942).
92. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445,447-49 (1969).
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 384 (1974).
94. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750 (1982).
95. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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the rules of strict scrutiny applicable to core speech. We might think of the
R.A. V. example as posing two choices. Does attaching high level scrutiny to
unprotected categories of speech enhance speech protection? Thus, does this
bestow even greater sovereignty in the people to determine their fate? Or,
alternatively, does enhancing the protection of unprotected categories carry
greater dangers to people and society? These are the critical questions of
architecture that need to be worked out in order to preserve the integrity of
the First Amendment.
Several rubrics are central to establishing and preserving a strong ar-
chitectural foundation. First, there is a need for clear definition as to what
constitutes a category of speech. Second, the speech must be evaluated ac-
cording to central justifications of free speech (such as self-government,
self-realization, or the pursuit of truth, to name a few) in order to assign the
proper level of valuation of the speech. Justifications, like self-government,
self-realization, or the pursuit of truth, would provide the underlying basis
for first-order, core categories of speech. Once this is done, a third rubric is
the employment of lexicographical reasoning, which calls for a lexical or
serial ordering of values.96 Under lexicographical reasoning, the value of a
category of speech will be assigned the relevant level of judicial scrutiny.
For example, core, high-valued speech will be judged under strict scrutiny;
minimal, unprotected speech will be assigned rational basis review. The
methodology of lexical reasoning will be quite helpful in lending coherence
to Free Speech. Fourth, and finally, rules of judicial scrutiny must be clari-
fied and assigned to the differently-valued levels of speech so that different-
ly-valued speech can be demarcated from each other under appropriate rules
of law. In this way, we can establish and maintain a certain coherence to
Free Speech law.
III. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Defining Categories of Speech
The first question critical to the architecture of Free Speech is defining
with precision a category of speech. When faced with a question of what to
do with a species of protected speech, we must determine what kind of
speech it is. Much rides on this initial value judgment. Is the speech in ques-
tion protected or unprotected? If protected, what form of protected speech is
it? Is the protected speech first-order or core speech? Likewise, if unpro-
tected, what form of unprotected speech is it: obscenity, fighting words, or
threat? Is the communicative conduct susceptible to multiple interpreta-
96. W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 43 (1930), discussed in Edward J. Eberle,
Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 434-35
(1992) [hereinafter Eberle, CW].
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tions? Could the communicative behavior exhibit more than one form of
protected or unprotected forms of speech? For example, could the speech be
political, but also commercial or an incitement to violence? If so, parts of
the cluster of communicative activity may be protected speech. Protected
speech could consist of communication involving protected categories of
multiple types. Still other parts of the communicative activity might be un-
protected. All of these judgments turn on the core question of how to value
the communication at issue and judge it according to reliable speech criteri-
on. For this, precise definition of the category of speech is essential, at least
as is reasonably possible. We must all acknowledge that our thinking capa-
bilities are not perfect, and this applies to fixing categories too.97 We can
only do the best we can.
Definition of core categories of protected speech is especially crucial
because core speech is the very essence of what the First Amendment pro-
tects. For example, political speech partakes of our desire to speak out and
affect public policy and the tenor of the society we live in. In Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, the Court framed the definition of political speech as con-
ceming discussion of "ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
opinion."9 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court
articulated the definition of political speech more simply: "It is speech on
'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection."' 99 The definition set forth in Hustler Magazine captures the
important domain of public discourse, but it also serves as a ready definition
of political speech more broadly. Under the definition, any discussion of an
idea or opinion on a matter of public interest or opinion should be consid-
ered political speech, as engagement in political speech is essential to the
lifeblood of democracy.
Religious speech, as I describe, is that which concerns people's dis-
cussion of God or other transcendental yearning of what is beyond the expe-
rience of normal, ordinary existence. Settling the concept of what is reli-
gious in a legal, not theological sense, is a necessary but difficult determina-
tion. A look at Free Exercise law can be a useful starting point.
There are at least two approaches. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court
took a more conventional, established approach to defining religion. Amish
belief was religious because it entailed a theocratic view "of deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
living."' The Yoder definition works well for conventional conceptions of
religion, but it excludes the wide range of unconventional practitioners of
97. Schauer, Categories, supra note 32, at 280-81.
98. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
99. 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
100. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
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religion present in the United States. A more accommodating definition of
religion can be gleaned from United States v. Seeger, where the Court fixed
the standard for judging Congressional exemption from military service as
"[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by ... God."'' Synthesizing both of these defi-
nitions may provide a more realistic, and workable, definition of religious
speech. For example, perhaps religious speech can be defined as speech
concerning: a sincere and meaningful belief in a God, spirit, or transcenden-
tal force which occupies in the life of its possessor a crucial place intimately
related to daily living. There might be other ways of defining religious
speech. This question, as so many in Free Speech law, calls for careful
working out through the hard crucibles of common law decision making.
Scientific or academic speech is that which involves the pursuit of
knowledge. More precisely, we can think of scientific speech as that which
advances the pursuit of knowledge through use of the scientific method in
proposing a proposition that helps comprise the paradigms that organize the
world we live in. More compactly, we might say scientific speech is speech
that sets forth a scientific proposition.0 2 The Court has not yet settled on a
precise definition of scientific speech, and so my definition can stand as a
working definition for scrutiny and comment as we work to settle on a pre-
cise definition.
The same can be said for artistic speech, where the Court has also yet
to provide a workable definition. I offer this definition of artistic speech in
the interim: "Art speech is the autonomous use of the artist's creative pro-
cess to make and fashion form, color, symbol, image, movement or other
communication of meaning that is made manifest in a tangible medium."'0 3
More work must be done to frame and tighten these definitions of core
categories of speech. The work of scholars or the hard facts of cases will
provide ample opportunity to flesh out workable definitions of categories of
speech, and then test them through experience in order to delineate more
precisely their boundaries. However this is done, safeguarding the central
core of Free Speech is the most urgent matter in Free Speech law because
core speech is most central to our daily lives and the functioning of the de-
mocracy.
The same process of definition applies to species of speech that are not
core or first-order categories. There are a range of types of speech that fit
within second-order, third-order, and lastly, fourth-order or unprotected
categories of speech that also call for precise definition. Rather than consid-
101. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
102. Christopher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 IOWA L. REV. 881, 899, 906
(2008). Of course, whether a scientific proposition is true or not will depend on the results of
it being put to the test. Science is not always a predictable subject.
103. Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, I I U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7 (2007-08).
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ering all of these possible categories, we will consider a few examples of
defining a species of speech that comprises a category to illustrate the pro-
cess. The process of definition is even more important for categories of
speech that are not first-order or core speech because of the need to differ-
entiate with clarity a lower-ranked category from that of core speech and,
thereby, safeguard core speech.
Let us start with second-order speech because that presents all the cru-
cial questions central to the architecture of the First Amendment: protecting
speech that is valued, but valued less highly than core speech. Precision in
definition is crucial in order to avoid the danger of doctrinal confusion---of
valuing a category of speech either too highly or too lowly and thus assign-
ing it too much or too little constitutional protection. Such doctrinal confu-
sion can seep into other categories of speech, upsetting settled expectations,
and undermining the cohesion of the First Amendment.
The Court was first presented with this dilemma when it reconsidered
the status of commercial speech in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 1 Prior to Virginia Phar-
macy Board, commercial speech was unprotected speech. 1°5
Determining that commercial speech should now be protected speech
because, under conventional Free Speech justifications, commercial speech
is an exposition of an idea, facilitates speaker and listener interests, and
provides information, the Court was now faced with the question of exactly
what is commercial speech.'016 The Court came up with this simple definition
of commercial speech: "[S]peech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction."" 7 Conventionally understood, commercial speech
is commercial advertising. As Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court,
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical,
or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to
make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The "idea" he
wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at
the Y price."'
' 08
The Court's definition of commercial speech effectively specifies that
commercial speech is and can only be commercial advertising-the selling
of a product or service at a certain price-and not political speech, speech
that editorializes, reports, or opines on matters germane to the world, in-
104. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
105. The seminal cases establishing the unprotected status of commercial speech
were Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) and Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
106. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762-65 (1976).
107. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
108. Id. at 761.
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cluding commerce. This process of definition demonstrates the precision in
word choice and content that is necessary to delineate different categories of
speech.
Likewise, the Court has done a good job of delineating unprotected
categories of speech. The process of defining unprotected categories of
speech is especially important because it "usefully channels official atten-
tion away from regulating speech and toward regulation of those narrow
categories of speech so imbued or closely linked with serious harm.... The
narrow definitions of these unprotected categories are designed to tailor
closely governmental regulation to the underlying harm."'0 9
For example, under Brandenburg v. Ohio, incitement can only be pro-
scribed when the speaker intends to cause imminent unlawfulness and such
unlawfulness is imminently likely to occur."' Fighting words are only
"those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are ... inherently likely to provoke violent reaction;""' actual mal-
ice public defamation is statements made "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not;" 2 and obscenity is
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 
3
Precise definition of categories of speech is an important first step in
establishing the architecture of the First Amendment.
Especially important to the architecture of the First Amendment is
clarity in constituting unprotected categories of speech. In these cases, the
109. Eberle, ASU, supra note 20, at 962.
110. 395 U.S 444, 447 (1969). The Court framed the incitement test as follows:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447..
111. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (redefining test set out in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
112. NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
113. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted). The best argu-
ments for treatment of obscenity as unprotected speech are: (1) it appeals to the sexual in-
stinct and, thus, is more like conduct than speech, and (2) even if obscenity is speech, it is
speech that is noncognitive. See Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech "-Obscenity and
"Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J.
899, 922, 925-29 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community
Standards ": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L.
REv. 1, 14-17 (1978). Thus, one might argue that such noncognitive speech has no relation to
the First Amendment. Id.
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burden is on government to show clearly that the behavior at issue meets the
burden of proof set forth in the tests for unprotected categories of speech.
This directs official attention to proving the elements that comprise harm,
separate and apart from the speech. If government cannot make its case, the
speech in question is protected. Unprotected categories of speech operate, in
essence, as default rules: prove your case or the speech is protected under
the First Amendment.
Directing governmental attention to the harm in question has the add-
ed benefit of shifting the battle away from speech. Directing the battle over
the meaning of speech to the outside of the circumference of the First
Amendment helps protect speech because the gales and flurries can pummel
the edge of protection instead of the central cores of communication.
Fighting battles at the core must be guarded against at all costs, lest we
erode our fundamental freedoms. In this manner, speech may be insulated,
to a degree, from the motives and proclivities of authority. In effect, the role
of government is cabined: prove harm independent of speech. Speech itself
is for citizens to determine. We can see how these are crucial elements to
the architecture of the First Amendment.
B. Establishing the Criterion for Justifying Speech
A second matter critical to establishing the architecture of the First
Amendment is determining the proper valuation of the numerous varieties
of protected speech. This assumes, of course, the first question in Free
Speech analysis: is the speech protected or not? In assessing the value of
speech for this question, our assumption is that it has already been deter-
mined that the speech is protected under the First Amendment. Being pro-
tected under the First Amendment, we must determine what level of protec-
tion the speech in question merits.
To determine valuation of speech, we must establish a criterion that
provides a sound and reasoned way of establishing the value of speech. I
suggest this criterion. First, we must assess the value of speech: is it of suf-
ficient value to be protected? Second, we must measure the speech action in
question to determine how much conduct elements it has. We must then
assess the communicative conduct against the speech/conduct dichotomy to
determine whether it merits protection as speech or nonprotection as con-
duct. Of course, no criterion is perfect and is subject to interpretation, reas-
sessment, and refinement. Perhaps other criterion might work as well. But
the value of a criterion is that it provides a measure by which to assess
speech and provide a basis on which to make a judgment thereby lending a
certain structure and coherence to the First Amendment."4 Let me explain
114. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 39 (1971).
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the rubrics of the criterion and then illustrate how they might be used to
order the different valuations of speech.
1. Value of Speech
In providing content to the rubric of valuing speech, we must explain
the value of speech. I suggest the key criterion in fixing a definition of value
is the relevance of communicative activity to the human condition. Admit-
tedly, this itself can be an obtuse and lengthy discourse on matters like
meaning, existence, or knowledge-topics well covered through the ages of
philosophy. But I am looking for a more pragmatic rubric, one that can aid
in the organization of different categories of speech.
One key criterion in establishing the value of speech is its relation to a
person's capacity to develop his or her mental faculties and personality and
to aid a person in the living of his or her life. After all, Free Speech is a pre-
serve of personal freedom, shielded from government absent exigent cir-
cumstance, and participation in Free Speech is the central way people can
develop their capacities and achieve personal identity so they can live as
they like. In the mind, a person thinks, deliberates, forms ideas and plans of
action, and then voices and acts on those thoughts. We might think of the
mind as the inner citadel of freedom, and that is why it is so essential to the
human condition.
Certainly there might be other ways of framing this rubric. Develop-
ment of mental capacities and personality has a certain resonance with theo-
ries of free speech famously articulated as ideas of "self-fulfillment,""' 5
"self-realization, "6 "liberty,"'' 7 or "autonomous self-determination."'' 8 All
of these speak to the central concern of Free Speech: providing people with
as much information as possible to make sense of themselves, their world,
and human existence. Simply stated, speech is intricately related to the hu-
man condition in all of its dimensions. We ordinarily refer to these justifica-
tions of speech as deontological or nonconsequential because these justifica-
tions are valuable per se and do not depend on justification based on another
value.
Free Speech also has an important role to play in addressing the hu-
man condition for the value it offers to purposes related to daily life. Most
115. THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
116. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 30 (1984);
Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to
Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1982).
117. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989); C. Ed-
win Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish 's The
Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 658 (1982).
118. David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
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notably, Free Speech promotes the formation and structuring of the political
will, a justification of speech resting on the idea of self-government or de-
mocracy." 9 Or speech may be instrumentally valuable for the pursuit of
truth, knowledge, or a better understanding of reality. 2° This variety of val-
ues is consequential or instrumental because its value lies in the furthering
of other ends. In sum, the value of speech can be measured both for its abil-
ity to aid the human condition (nonconsequential) and to further improve-
ment of daily life (consequential).
Demonstration of how the first rubric of value, based on, first, devel-
opment of human capacity and personality (nonconsequential) and, second,
aid in living (consequential), can be provided through illustration. Again,
we resort to the core categories of speech, which are centrally related to
development of human capacity and personality. For example, political
speech is crucial to the ability of a person to be heard and valued as he or
she thereby can affect the tenor of public policies and the character of the
society we live in or hope to live in. These topics have a central impact on
the human person and daily life. Religious speech addresses the transcend-
ent, spiritual element of human personality. Scientific speech involves the
search for pure truth and is crucial to human existence because it helps de-
velop the thinking capacities central to human existence and autonomy. Art
speech partakes of the creative process central and unique to human exist-
ence. All of these core categories of speech are central components in the
development of human capacities, such as thought, personality, awareness,
or identity.
Likewise, the core categories are centrally linked to promoting pur-
poses crucial to daily life. For example, political speech furthers the mar-
ketplace of ideas critical to the fixing of public policies; religious speech is
central to the acquisition of meaning in life; scientific speech helps form the
data that comprises the paradigms we structure our world around; and artis-
tic speech can be valuable in illustrating creativity, originality, and emotions
integral to human personality.
We can see that all of these core categories of protected speech are
central to human existence in the twenty-first century and thereby provide
easy justification for their status as first-order, core categories. The more
important question is how other, less highly-valued categories of speech
come out under this rubric. A starting point, of course, is how a particular
category measures up against a core category in relation to its importance to
human personality. In a sense, this question calls for an examination of the
Free Speech justifications of the category of speech in question, and exam-
ining how these justifications compare to the intrinsically and instrumental-
119. The classic work is ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
120. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
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ly valuable justifications present in core speech categories. We will need to
take up this question later, as first we must turn to explanation of the second
rubric of justification.
2. Speech/Conduct
A second rubric useful to sorting out the value of speech is application
of the speech/conduct dichotomy. To be protected constitutionally, behavior
must possess communicative qualities; therefore, behavior devoid of com-
municative qualities is not protected speech.121 Instead, pure behavior directs
official attention to the personal or social behavioral interests that should be
secured in order to protect public health, safety, and welfare. These are the
easy questions of Free Speech. The difficult questions of Free Speech in-
volve behavior with elements of both communicative and
noncommunicative qualities. An example is the burning of a cross in cases
like R.A. V 122 or Virginia v. Black.'23 Burning a cross is a clear expression of
hate, a vile truth the speaker is expressing. But burning a cross on some-
one's property could also be arson, trespass, or assault-all
noncommunicative behavior.
The value of the speech/conduct dichotomy is as an organizing princi-
ple of Free Speech. Behavior can be of at least three types as measured on
the speech/conduct dichotomy. First, behavior may be pure speech, devoid
of conduct. Examples of this would be talking, writing, raising your finger
to say "fuck you," burning a flag, or communication of a threat. Even with
pure speech, we must determine if the pure speech is protected or unprotect-
ed. If the speech is considered protected, like political or religious speech,
then it is constitutional. However, even if the action is pure speech it may be
unprotected. Examples would be a threat, false speech, actual malice defa-
mation, or obscenity. Second, behavior may contain a mix of speech and
conduct, as in R. A. V. and Black. In this case, some of the behavior may be
protected speech, and some of it will be unprotected speech. Third, behavior
can be pure behavior, devoid of speech and, therefore, unprotected speech.
An example of this would be driving a car.
Application of the speech/conduct rubric provides a measure by which
to assess a category of speech's position on the speech/conduct rubric. The
closer the speech stands in relation to speech, the greater justification for its
higher valuation. The closer the speech stands in relation to conduct, the
lesser justification for its higher valuation. Use of the speech/conduct di-
chotomy is critical to preserving the integrity of the First Amendment. Cru-
cial here is protecting the core of Free Speech. Whatever battles are to be
121. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409-10 (1974).
122. 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992).
123. 538 U.S. 343, 343 (2003).
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fought over Free Speech, they should occur at the fringe of the Amendment,
not its core. Speech/conduct helps direct the placement of these battles.
Before applying the rubric of speech/conduct, we need to be clear
what speech and conduct mean. The speech/conduct dichotomy is largely a
pragmatic distinction. All speech activity is behavior; for example, reading
and writing, speaking and listening, or picketing. What distinguishes it as
speech are its communicative qualities. Behavior devoid of
noncommunicative qualities constitutes conduct, which is a legitimate inter-
est addressed by the police powers of government. Thus, the only relevant
inquiry for Free Speech is: how much and how valuable are the communica-
tive qualities present in the behavior at issue? Restating the measure: the
greater the presence of communicative qualities, the stronger the argument
for speech protection; the greater the presence of noncommunicative quali-
ties, the stronger the argument for treatment as conduct.
Use of speech/conduct understood in this way can be a helpful tool to
sort out the varied valuations of speech. A good example involves commer-
cial speech. Commercial speech is, of course, speech because it constitutes
the communication of an offer of a service or product for a stated price-
essentially a commercial advertisement. But the quality of the communica-
tion also relies upon underlying conduct components. Commercial advertis-
ing is really the offer of a contract: buy this product or service at this price.
"[T]he commercial speaker not only talks about a product, but also sells
it."'24 There is a close nexus between "the speech proposing a commercial
transaction and the subsequent transactions in which sellers and buyers en-
gage." '125 The subsequent transaction is handled by contract law, which regu-
lates the behavior of contracting parties; contract law speaks to conduct, not
speech. Thus, in measuring commercial speech, we can see that it has a
close relationship to conduct. Its closer relationship to conduct can be useful
124. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.
L. REv. 372, 386 (1979) [hereinafter Farber, Commercial Speech]; see Daniel Farber, The
Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J.
917, 935-36 (2009) [hereinafter Farber, Categorical Approach] (observing how commercial
speech and pornography are based on profits, more akin to conduct than speech).
125. Eberle, CW, supra note 96, at 462. For careful explication of commercial
speech's proximity to contract law, see Farber, Commercial Speech, supra note 124, at 387-
89. The contractual function of commercial speech helps
explain[] the intuitive belief that commercial speech is somehow more akin to con-
duct than . . . other forms of speech. The unique aspect of commercial speech is
that it is a prelude to, and therefore becomes integrated into, a contract, the essence
of which is the presence of a promise. Because a promise is an undertaking to en-
sure that a certain state of affairs take place, promises obviously have a closer con-
nection with conduct than with self-expression. Second, this approach focuses on
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in assigning a proper valuation to commercial speech under the First
Amendment. Because commercial speech stands in a close relationship to
conduct through contract law, it should merit less valuation as speech than
speech that stands in a more distant relationship to conduct, such as most
political or religious speech.
Evaluation of commercial speech with the speech/conduct dichotomy
also serves other important values of the architecture of the First Amend-
ment. The contractual purpose of commercial speech provides a basis for
identifying commercial speech, a basis captured in its definition as "speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction." '1 26 A key
distinguishing trait of commercial speech is its close nexus between speech
and the ensuing commercial transaction. By so crystallizing the definition of
commercial speech, its content and treatment can be demarcated from other
elements of speech, thereby forming an important component of precise
categorization. 27
126. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973)). The Court also distinguished commercial speech as possessing lesser value than
core speech on account of its easier verifiability and greater durability than other types of
speech, convincing rationales for assigning a species of speech a lesser protected status. Id. at
771 n.24. Measuring speech based on its relationship to verifiability and durability is an
additional sound way to order the value of speech. By this measure, the more verifiable or
durable speech is, the tendency would be to value it lower because its dissemination will
ordinarily be robust on account of its nature and therefore less in need of enhanced protection
from the human tendency to control, through censorship in the case of speech. For example,
commercial speech is verifiable because it is an offer of a product or service that represents
an underlying real contractual relation. Measuring the commercial speech as contract offer
against the actual commercial transaction, the speech either mirrors the actual commercial
transaction and is, therefore, true, or the speech is misleading or false. Id Likewise, commer-
cial speech is more durable than other forms of speech because money is spent to promote it.
At the root of commercial speech lies the profit-motive. Commercial advertising thrived in
the world before Virginia Pharmacy in 1976. For elaboration of this rationale, see Eberle,
CW, supra note 96, at 469-76. Labor speech and political campaign donations are also likely
to be more verifiable and more durable species of speech for the reasons described above
with respect to commercial speech. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749, 787-89 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare "In evaluating the subject
matter of expression, this Court has consistently rejected the argument that speech is entitled
to diminished First Amendment protection simply because it concerns economic matters or is
in the economic interest of the speaker or the audience," with "Speech about commercial or
economic matters, even if not directly implicating 'the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment,' is an important part of our public discourse." Id. at 787 (quoting NY Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S 254 (1964)). Most critical to a system of free speech, speech that is more
verifiable and more durable is less likely to involve unpopular or dissenting views and, in-
stead, is more likely to entail popular views. Given the configuration of majoritarian views
with majoritarian power, there is likely to be a much lesser danger of overregulation or cen-
sorship. These make for sound reasons why species of speech that are more verifiable and
more durable are less deserving of a status of core speech.
127. Eberle, CW, supra note 96, at 463.
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Further, the contractual function of commercial speech brings into fo-
cus the important state interests that underlie commercial speech. These
state interests include contract doctrines of falsity, fraud, misrepresentation,
coercion, overreaching, harassment, duress, and unconscionability. Identifi-
cation of state interests like these uncovers a legitimate concern of govern-
ment--consumer protection-apart from speech. Government can have a
legitimate interest in regulating speech that does not implicate First
Amendment values, thus providing a basis for regulation apart from sup-
pression of speech. Identifying a basis for governmental regulation apart
from speech better protects speech from suppression. 2 ' We can thus see
how use of a speech/conduct dichotomy can be helpful to sorting out the
issues involved in protecting Free Speech.
Assessment of categories of speech against the two rubrics of value
and speech/conduct will call upon our reasoning abilities and sound judg-
ment. We will need to employ the skill of practical reasoning-reasoning
through the problem in a sound analytical manner so that "reasonably relia-
ble"'29 solutions can be reached. Part of this will involve use of intuition-
ism-identifying first principles and then assessing categories of speech
against them. This would be the approach of nonconsequentialist thinking,
and it has especial importance in determining first order forms of speech,
which then can serve, in turn, as a measure for other, lower-ordered forms
of speech. And part of this will entail practical reason---assessing the values
and interests presented by a category of speech, understanding them in their
context, and comparing them to other forms of speech to see where they sit
in the world of Free Speech. The results of real life scenarios decided in
cases will be particularly instructive.
Still, we must be quite careful here. The older two-level theory of
Chaplinsky had certain advantages. Most importantly, the methodology of
speech was quite simple: speech was either protected or not. This had the
great advantage of making Free Speech doctrine coherent, especially for
those on the front-line of the Free Speech battles: prosecutors, authorities,
and judges. The modem reconception of Free Speech, however, has effec-
tively undermined the technical applicability of the Chaplinsky approach.
Yet, we need to recognize certain guideposts. First, the two-level theo-
ry suggested by Chaplinsky still applies, analogously, in the modem meth-
odology of determining whether speech is protected or not. Consider again
the categorical approach: government must prove the elements that com-
prise an unprotected category of speech. If government cannot make its
case, the speech is protected. This helps direct the Free Speech battles to
128. Id.
129. RAWLS, supra note 114, at44.
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where it most matters: at the fringe of the Amendment, which has the im-
portant benefit of safeguarding the core.
Second, given the complexity of social reality and how it has been
reevaluated through the First Amendment prism-resulting in protection for
many more types of speech that are of different value-the levels of Free
Speech protection have been expanded from two to four. This is an inevita-
ble consequence of the broadening of the Amendment. Still, we must be
careful here. We should be reluctant to create secondary categories of
speech, at levels of two or three, in order to present as simple and coherent a
theory of Free Speech as we can. This is especially significant for those on
the frontlines of the Free Speech battles (again, prosecutors, authorities, and
judges) so that mistakes in application of law will be less likely. 3 ° The pro-
cess described in this Part suggests one reasoned way to accomplish this
objective; that is applying a species of speech against the criterion for fixing
valuation.
C. Ordering Speech
Given that the modem First Amendment contains a variety of differ-
ently-valued speech, it is quite likely to present new candidates for inclusion
or noninclusion in the Amendment (such as, for example, videos of dog
fights, just recently decided by the Supreme Court as protected speech a.)
that themselves will involve communicative value of different orders. It is
important we sort out the different levels of speech. Quite helpful to the
ordering of levels of speech are insights derived from moral philosophy.
The tools of moral philosophy call for use of reason and logic to sort out the
principles that comprise knowledge and help resolve conflicts among con-
tending moral principles. When faced with this dilemma, a way must be
found to resolve the conflict. Essentially, this calls for use of judgment; we
need to critically analyze the situation, considering all of its components, so
that it may be resolved in an ethically satisfying manner.'
John Rawls characterized this approach as "intuitionism." '33 By intui-
tionism, Rawls meant a doctrine containing "an irreducible family of first
principles which have to be weighed against one another by asking our-
selves which balance, in our considered judgment, is the most just."'3 a Intui-
tionism relies on our powers of reasoning and judgment. We identify prin-
ciples we consider "most just" or "most nearly right."'35 Intuitionist theories
130. Schauer, Categories, supra note 32, at 294-96, 306-07.
131. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
132. Eberle, CW, supra note 96, at 433; see generally id. at 433-40.
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can be deontological or instrumental, but most commonly, they are deonto-
logical. 136
An example of a deontological intuitionist theory is that of W.D. Ross.
Ross viewed the problem of moral philosophy as one of distributive justice,
calling for the distribution of goods according to moral worth. But "while
the principle to produce the most good ranks as a first principle, it is but one
such principle which must be balanced against the claims of the other prima
facie principles."'37 Thus, when presented with a justice conflict between
competing moral claims, one must try to find a "constructive answer ... to
the problem of assigning weights to competing principles of justice." '138 This
is referred to as the "priority problem" in moral philosophy.
We can see the ready analogy to Free Speech law. Like moral philos-
ophy, Free Speech contains a number of values that vie for dominance.
Seminal Free Speech values include pursuit of truth and knowledge, self-
government, self-realization, personal autonomy, and the like. Each of these
values stands in a close relationship to underlying purposes of speech: prox-
imity to human existence and to human daily life. The importance of com-
munication is generally judged insofar as it furthers seminal values like the-
se. The closer relation the communication has to core Free Speech values-
implicating matters central to human existence-the greater its value; con-
versely, the lesser relation the communication has to core Free Speech val-
ues, the lesser the value. We need a rubric to sort out the possible ways of
judging speech, a problem shared with moral philosophy.
Here, too, we can resort to moral philosophy for some useful guid-
ance. A major tool to employ is lexicographical reasoning, which calls for a
serial or lexical ordering of values. It "requires us to satisfy the first princi-
ple in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before
we consider the third, and so on."' 39 In this manner, Ross ranked moral
worth as lexically superior to nonmoral values. Kant placed the priority of
rights as the first rank." These are clear orderings: moral values should
outweigh nonmoral values; rights or prima facie duties should outweigh
other considerations. A more difficult problem is a conflict between moral
values of equal weight. In such situations, the conflict must be evaluated
and resolved in an ethically satisfying manner."' Here, we must rely on our
reasoning capabilities; we must critically evaluate the situation, sifting
through and considering carefully all of the possibilities, consequences, and
the respective weights of the interests through use of sound practical judg-
136. Id. at40.
137. Id. (citing Ross, supra note 96, at 21-27).
138. Id.
139. Id. at43.
140. Id. at 42-43 n.23.
141. Ross, supra note 96, at 149-54.
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ment. "'42 This task is one "of reducing and not of eliminating entirely the
reliance on intuitive judgments."'43 The goal is to reach a "reasonably relia-
ble agreement."' "
Serial or lexical reasoning has ready application to Free Speech law.
First, serial reasoning can be quite useful in ordering the various categories
of speech. As with moral philosophy, we must rank the speech according to
its value. Highly-valued core speech, such as political, religious, scientific,
or artistic, will be assigned the greatest value. Such core speech will be pre-
sumptively protected unless there is some clear demonstration of a concrete
harm to a person or society. Second, serial reasoning can also be quite use-
ful in ordering socio-economic concerns that government is addressing as
valid state interests. Here, different levels of legal analysis will apply to the
significance of the state interests. If the state interest is of an overriding
concern, then a very strict line of analysis will be applied to the speech to
determine which of the speech or the governmental interest is weightier. If
the state interest is basic, then a loose line of analysis will be applied to the
speech, almost always resulting in the speech trumping the state interest.
Applying serial reasoning to categories of speech, we can come up
with the ordering of speech according to the four levels discussed above.
First-order speech is the most prized because it has the closet relationship to
the seminal values of expression, such as understanding and furthering con-
trol of the human condition through values of personal autonomy or self-
realization, or through understanding or influencing the world around us
through values like self-government or the pursuit of truth. Because of their
close relationship to these seminal nonconsequential and consequential val-
ues, we group first-order, core speech as political, religious, scientific, and
artistic speech. Second-order speech has important communicative proper-
ties but has a less close nexus to the seminal values of speech and, also, may
have a closer relationship to conduct as measured by the speech/conduct
dichotomy. Our discussion of commercial speech illustrates why this is so.
Thus, we might say second-order speech comprises commercial speech,
labor speech, and offensive speech, to name some species. Third-level
speech has an even further distance from the seminal values of speech and
may have an even closer connection to conduct. For example, in the case of
nude dancing, dancing, even in the nude, certainly conveys a message. The
message here is adult entertainment, as if you were watching live entertain-
142. Aristotle would have referred to this as "practical judgment" or "practical wis-
dom." ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK VI (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). Kant
termed it "universal practical reasoning." IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 32-33 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck trans., 1976) (all
moral concepts have their origin in practical, rational reasoning).
143. RAWLS, supra note 114, at 44.
144. Id.
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ment, like a play or a dance. However, to the extent that nude dancing is for
adult entertainment, it is somewhat remote from seminal Free Speech values
like self-realization or pursuit of truth, even remoter than that of commercial
speech. Because the adult-oriented nude dancing is ordinarily done in ex-
change for money and arousal of the sexual function, it also has a closer
nexus to conduct. "5 Conventional third-level speech would be nude danc-
ing, pornography, defamation against private parties, and private speech.
Finally, fourth-level or unprotected speech has the most remote connection
to core speech values and the closest proximity to conduct. For example, a
threat is quite far removed from seminal speech values and, instead, quite
closely related to conduct; in fact, it is a communication about ready to ges-
tate into conduct. Standard fourth-level speech is obscenity, actual malice
defamation, incitements to violence, threats or fighting words, among oth-
ers. Of course, each of the four categories of speech is open for both new
candidates and for reassessment of the status of existing candidates. The
dynamics of social reality are such that change is always afoot.
We might likewise use serial reasoning to order social interests that
are juxtaposed against speech. For example, first-order or "compelling"
governmental interests would include clear, present, imminent, and serious
dangers to individuals; the state order; or public health, safety, or welfare.
Here, we might include interests like threats, incitements to violence, or
serious threats to national security, such as "publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops," especially during war-
time. 46 Second-order or "substantial" state interests would include speech
that is deceptive, misleading, or violative of certain human interests, such as
privacy concerns. 47 Third-order or "rational" interests would include the
traditional concerns of things like maintaining the streets and public facili-
ties in a sanitary and workable fashion.
Use of serial reasoning can thus offer a certain structure and coherence
to Free Speech law. But, of course, serial reasoning, as with any reasoning,
can only go so far, providing aid, but not a complete solution. The essence
of Free Speech decision making, like all legal decision making, is solving
the concrete problem. For this, we must, once again, rely upon our reason-
ing capabilities. Here, use of sound, practical judgment can be of great use.
Use of practical judgment, luckily, does not occur in a void with re-
spect to First Amendment law. We have a rich tradition of constitutional
decision making, relying on concern for the Constitution's language, struc-
145. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) ("As we explained in
Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we
think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection."); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality opinion).
146. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
147. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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ture, context, and history, and then consideration of the large body of prece-
dent, which usefully illustrates what works and what has not worked. Com-
mon law decision making is central here, which entails use of:
reasoned judgment [which is] close criticism going to the details of the opposing
interests and to their relationships with the historically recognized principles that
lend them weight or value....
• .. like any other instance of judgment dependent on common-law method, being
more or less persuasive according to the usual canons of critical discourse....
•. I. Common law method tends to pay respect.., to detail, seeking to understand
old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples.
148
Thus, these judgments are not unguided but bounded by identifiable princi-
ples and techniques.
Here, too, we can start with serial reasoning, applying it to the context
of concrete decision making. For example, first-order speech, like political
speech, clearly outweighs third-level interests, like maintaining the street.
Such speech will presumptively outweigh second-level interests, like decep-
tion or certain privacy concerns; but it may or may not prevail over first-
order interests, especially if they are a clear and present danger to a person
or the social order. Likewise, third-order speech, like private speech, might
outweigh a third-order interest like the sanitation of the streets. But it will
not prevail over a second-order interest, like deception; and it will certainly
lose in relation to a clear and present danger. Serial reasoning will not an-
swer all questions, but it will lend structure and a certain coherence to Free
Speech questions.
In this way, attention can be directed to solving the concrete balance
between speech and social interests within the serial order. The judgment to
be made is thereby cabined within appropriate limits offered by serial rea-
soning. After that, the question must be resolved through the standard pro-
cess of concrete practical reasoning, the optimal form of common law deci-
sion making. Taking account of the rich constitutional tradition described
above, we must then search for reasonably reliable judgments as to how to
make the proper accommodation of speech values in relation to state inter-
ests situated in a socio-economic context. 149
D. Levels of Scrutiny
A final rubric crucial to establishing and maintaining the architecture
of the First Amendment is assigning appropriate levels of scrutiny to the
148. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769-70 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted) (discussing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting and Harlan's elaboration of substantive Due Process judicial decision making).
149. Eberle, CW, supra note 96, at 439-40.
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differently-valued categories of speech. Speech must be ordered according
to its value. In a system of law, this calls for development and application of
a rule of law in accord with the value of speech. Through the process of
valuation and its ordering by serial reasoning, we have seen how communi-
cation can be sorted pursuant to four levels of value: high, intermediate,
low, and minimal. We must now establish a rule of law appropriate to each
of the four levels of speech.
Establishing a system of law concerning speech is critical to delineat-
ing the different categories of speech so that their value can be properly
assessed for its own worth. Identification of the species of speech is critical
to this task. Two means are readily available to accomplish the task of iden-
tification. The first is fitting the species of speech into its properly defined
category; for example, speech that concerns matters germane to public poli-
cy constitutes political speech. The second is the corollary to this process of
assigning the proper level of scrutiny to the category of speech under re-
view. By identifying speech by its category and its level of scrutiny, we can
establish a sound structure to order speech according to its value. The struc-
ture provides a workable way of ordering speech according to its value so
that one level of speech is judged properly according to its estimation as
compared to it being judged by rules of law more applicable to speech that
might be higher or lower valued. This process of separating speech by value
allows legal authorities to focus attention on the speech for its own qualities.
Most importantly, the ordering structure helps guard against a major con-
cem of modern Free Speech law: doctrinal confusion-caused by judging a
species of speech according to levels of scrutiny that are appropriate to ei-
ther higher- or lower-valued categories. Such misapplication of doctrine
carries with it the danger of undermining the structure of First Amendment
law. Clarity and cohesion in the law will help rein in the discretion of judg-
es, who play the major role in the development of Free Speech law.
Now we are called upon to develop the rules of law applicable to the
categories of speech. The four levels of speech each have their own level of
scrutiny. Core or first-order speech is judged pursuant to strict scrutiny;
intermediate or second-order speech is judged pursuant to intermediate scru-
tiny; third-order or low-level speech is judged according a general balancing
of interest test comparing the merits of the speech versus the merits of the
regulation; and fourth-order or minimal-value speech is judged by the ra-
tional basis test, where government simply has to show a rational reason for
the law resulting in the speech being unprotected. Each of the four levels of
scrutiny can be classified differently.
First-order and fourth-order speech can be labeled as categorical: the
speech is classified as a categorical formula involving a prepackaged formu-
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la which will lead to relatively predictable outcomes. 5° For example, first-
order speech will be evaluated under strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny,
speech will almost always win unless government can prove a compelling
or urgent case-a weighted balancing test that tips the scale heavily in favor
of speech. Strict scrutiny is highly predictable. Minimally-protected speech
will almost always result in a determination of unprotected speech unless
the government fails to show any plausible basis for the legal measure.
Here, the weighted balancing test tips the scale in favor of the government.
The categorical formula can be classified as a rule; the rule can act as
a safe harbor, guarding first- and fourth-order speech from the vicissitudes
of human nature. The rule-based approach lends itself to high predictability
in Free Speech law by setting out clear rules of law that provide useful
guidance about the permissible scope of regulation to governmental offi-
cials, like legislators and judges, and thereby helps significantly limit per-
sonal discretion, most notably employed by judges, but could also involve
lawyers, speakers, and listeners.' We can think of rules as cementing the
core of First Amendment architecture.
By contrast, second- and third-order speech involve a balancing ap-
proach. Under the balancing approach, the importance of the value of
speech must be measured against the importance of the governmental inter-
ests.'52 The balancing is more akin to an act of judicial judgment. The bal-
ancing approach can be classified as a standard, not a rule. Balancing is
150. Farber, Categorical Approach, supra note 124, at 919, 920-21; see also Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 293, 293 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging].
Categorization is the taxonomist's style-a job of classification and labeling.
When categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigation is done at
the outset. Once the relevant right and mode of infringement have been described,
the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial balancing of the claimed right
against the government's justification for the infringement. [In contrast]
[b]alancing is more like grocer's work (of Justice's)-the judge's job is to place
competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them against each other. Here
the outcome is not determined at the outset, but depends on the relative strength of
a multitude of factors.
Id. at 293-94. As Kathleen Sullivan observes, "Categorization corresponds to rules, balanc-
ing to standards." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REv. 22, 59 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Supreme Court]. Categoricalism "pro-
mote[s] economies for the judicial decisonmaker by minimizing the elaborate, time-
consuming, and repetitive application of background principles to facts." Id. at 63. "[O]nce
the categories are established, further ad hoc balancing is cut off .... Sullivan, Post-Liberal
Judging, supra at 295 n.6. "Rules, once formulated, afford decisionmakers less discretion
than do standards." Sullivan, Supreme Court, supra at 57.
151. Farber, Categorical Approach, supra note 124, at 932. ("[W]e have particular
reason to want to avoid having the judges' ideological biases enter into the decision, lest
those biases then have a distorting effect on public discourse.").
152. Id. at 919.
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more open ended as compared to the close-ended, categorical approach.
"Balancing suggested a particularistic, case-by-case, common law approach
that accommodated gradual change and rejected absolutes."'53 Only through
case-by-case determinations will the standard approach become somewhat
clearer, perhaps resulting in some form of concrete guidance. Still, given the
discretionary approach of balancing, it will be far less predictable than a
categorical approach.
Comparing categoricalism against balancing, categoricalism puts the
case "inside certain predetermined, outcome-determinative lines," leading to
high predictability and clarity in the law.'54 Balancing involves a weighing
of the right against the governmental interest. Thus, categoricalism "'binds
a decision-maker to respond in a determinative way to the presence of de-
limited triggering facts,"' whereas "[b]alancing . . . 'tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle
or policy to a fact situation."" 55 This is the difference between rules (catego-
ries) and standards (balancing).
The genesis of this approach likely originated in the debate between
Justices Black and Frankfurter. Justice Black wanted to confine judicial
discretion, whereas Justice Frankfurter wanted to exercise judicial discre-
tion. Justice Black asserted an approach of categoricalism:
[T]he very object of adopting ... the Bill of Rights, was to put the freedoms pro-
tected there completely out of the area of any congressional control that may be at-
tempted through the exercise of precisely those powers that are now being used to
"balance" the Bill of Rights out of existence.
5 6
By contrast, Justice Frankfurter believed in a balancing approach:
Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to the
well-being of the country .... If adjudication is to be a rational process, we cannot
153. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 961 (1987).
154. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 381 (2009).
155. Id.
156. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
To apply the Court's balancing test . . . is to read the First Amendment to say
"Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and pe-
tition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on
balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the
interest of the people in having them exercised."
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). "[U]nless we
once again accept the notion that the Bill of Rights means what it says and that this Court
must enforce that meaning, I am of the opinion that our great charter of liberty will be more
honored in the breach than in the observance." Id. at 143-44.
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escape a candid examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition that
both are supported by weighty title deeds.
157
Let me now speak briefly to each of the four levels of scrutiny. Core
or first-order speech is judged pursuant to the most exacting scrutiny. This
is appropriate because core speech possesses the most communicative val-
ue, either on account of its intrinsic worth to the human condition or its val-
ue in furthering ends crucial to daily life. The Court has framed its genre of
most exacting scrutiny as strict scrutiny, analysis that requires government
to justify its regulation as "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
[] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 58 Strict scrutiny normally attaches
when fundamental rights are implicated or when government targets people
based on traits comprising justifications for a suspect class or similar dis-
criminatory treatment under equal protection review.'59 Core speech, by
definition, is considered to be the very essence of the fundamental right of
Free Speech, thereby meriting its incursion only upon justification by the
most exacting, strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny analysis is well worked out and highly predictable.
Gerald Gunther's famous description of strict scrutiny as 'strict' in theory,
and fatal in fact"'6° still largely applies with respect to core speech determi-
nations, and this is appropriate. The Court has toyed with the definition and
application in recent times. But this effort, at least concerning Free Speech,
has been directed to heightening the degree of review associated with strict
scrutiny. R.A. V. is the best example of this phenomenon. In R.A. V., the
Court developed and applied a two-level approach to strict scrutiny when
content regulation was at hand. Content regulation can be either subject
matter discrimination or viewpoint discrimination. Subject-matter discrimi-
157. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions
would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic
society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems
to be solved.
Id. at 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
158. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
159. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (discriminating
against discrete and insular minorities constitutes suspect class triggering strict scrutiny),
with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 219-24 (1995) (under color-blind
approach applicable to affirmative action, preference of race triggers strict scrutiny).
160. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). The Court has
reduced the strength of Gunther's classic formulation of strict scrutiny in equal protection
affirmative action cases. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 237 ("[W]e wish to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'). No such reduction of
strict scrutiny analysis is discernible in Free Speech law.
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nation is justifiable only upon satisfaction of traditional strict scrutiny anal-
ysis. When viewpoint discrimination is afoot, however, as in R.A. V, then
the Court applies a more exacting standard to judge the means chosen by
government to pursue the compelling end. In R.A. V, the viewpoint discrim-
ination in singling out only politically incorrect forms of fighting words
could be justified only if it were "necessary to serve the asserted [compel-
ling] interest," even though the Court conceded that the city had met its
burden in showing that it had a compelling reason to act.161 I have referred
to this form of analysis as "strict scrutiny plus necessity,"' 62 and it shows
how there is room to work out even more precise formulations of law
through the process of concrete decision making.
Second-order or intermediate categories of speech merit intermediate
scrutiny, originated in Virginia Pharmacy, and still applicable today as
framed by the Court in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission:
For commercial speech to come within ... [the First Amendment], it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the government interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that inter-
est.'
63
Applicable to commercial speech, this test states the core elements of
intermediate scrutiny: that the governmental interest be substantial or im-
161. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion)). For fuller discussion of
this point, see Eberle, WF, supra note tO, at 1170-78.
162. Eberle, WF, supra note 10, at 1178. Perhaps the Court may, at some point, be
headed for even more enhanced protection of speech than employment of conventional strict
scrutiny. Justice Kennedy has even argued for a per se rule of unconstitutionality in cases of
pure censorship, in place of strict scrutiny:
The case before us presents the opportunity to adhere to a surer test for content-
based cases and to avoid using an unnecessary formulation [strict scrutiny], one
with the capacity to weaken central protections of the First Amendment. I would
recognize this opportunity to confirm our past holdings and to rule that the New
York statute amounts to raw censorship based on content, censorship forbidden by
the text of the First Amendment and well-settled principles protecting speech and
the press. That ought to end the matter.
Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). By contrast, in race-targeting equal protection law, the Court has lowered the level
of strict scrutiny. "[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact."' Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
163. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980). A plurality of the Court has recently argued that truthful commercial speech should
be accorded the highest level of protection, strict scrutiny. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion). This makes sense, as truthful speech is
valuable for both speakers and listeners and presents no harm. Eberle, CW, supra note 96, at
485-91.
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portant and that government employ means substantially related to the sub-
stantial governmental interest. The Central Hudson test for speech is in
need of refinement. The first two elements of the Central Hudson test seem
legitimate. Commercial speech cannot be protected as speech unless, one,
the activity is lawful and, two, the speech is not misleading. If these two
elements are satisfied, then the speech is protected and government can only
win if it can establish that its legal measure "serve[s] important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those ob-
jectives."'" This simpler and more predictable statement of intermediate
scrutiny can be gleaned from equal protection law: "To withstand constitu-
tional challenge, . . . [government must establish that its legal measure]
serve[s] important governmental objectives and must be substantially relat-
ed to achievement of those objectives."'65 Refining the intermediate scrutiny
test applicable to second-order speech along the lines of conventional in-
termediate scrutiny-judging ends and means to see if they are substan-
tial-would provide for an easier and more predictable test. Moreover, the
relationship between ends and means should now be tightened so that there
is a closer nexus between the two, and not looser, so as to protect the integ-
rity of the First Amendment.
There is also an argument that commercial speech is truthful; thus, it
should be accorded high-level protection under strict scrutiny. Perhaps any
truthful speech should be accorded high protection, as truth is critical to free
speech and the development of our personalities. If commercial speech is
misleading, it should most likely be judged under a general balancing-of-
interest test. If commercial speech is false, it should be judged under the
rational basis test, as all other areas of unprotected speech. Unprotected
speech has minimal or no value.
Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for second-order speech for the
same reasons it is appropriate for quasi-suspect classes in equal protection
law: the value of the constitutional activity is important, but less important
than constitutional activities of a higher order. In the case of speech, com-
mercial speech is simply less valuable than core speech, like political or
religious speech. Accordingly, it should have high value, but lesser value
than speech critical to a person or the body politic. A word choice of "im-
portant" or "substantial" conveys adequately the notion that the speech is
valued as significant, but not as great magnitude, as is conveyed by a justifi-
cation of regulation by a "compelling" interest.' 66
164. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
165. Id.
166. With the advent of intermediate scrutiny, in 1976, in both commercial speech
and gender discrimination, the scrutiny has had a mixed history. In the immediate aftermath
of Virginia Pharmacy, intermediate scrutiny was applied to commercial speech with rigor.
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363-66 (1977). But later, members of the
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Third-order or low-level speech should be judged according to a gen-
eral balancing-of-interest test that calls for judgments to be made by weigh-
ing the merits of the speech as compared to the merits of the governmental
interests. If the speech has more worth than the governmental interest, then
the speech should remain protected and impervious to regulation. If the
governmental interest outweighs the value of the speech, government can
regulate the speech. This process will, by definition, call for the exercise of
judgment to settle the exigencies of the case. Over time, the law will sort
itself out according to the normal process of common law decision making.
A general balancing-of-interest test seems appropriate to third-order
speech because while this level of speech has value and is, accordingly,
protected under the First Amendment, it does not have the stature of first- or
second-order speech. Lacking the greater worth of those types of speech,
there is no reason to apply a form of heightened scrutiny to assess the de-
gree of constitutional regulation. Instead, a simple assessment of the value
of the speech compared to that of the governmental interest seems appropri-
ate.
There are ready analogies to employment of a general balancing-of-
interest test. One is Justice Frankfurter's approach to Free Speech questions:
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in na-
tional security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing
interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas
too inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems to be solved.1
67
Court battled over what intermediate scrutiny meant in application, resulting in a diminished
level of review, more akin in respects to rational basis review. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R.
Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340-44 (1986). In 1996, the Court restored
intermediate scrutiny to the rigor it had under the regime of Virginia Pharmacy in 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510-12. The path of intermediate scrutiny in gender discrimination
paralleled that of commercial speech. Compare Michael M. v. Sonoma Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981) (reduced scrutiny), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-39 (1996)
(heightening scrutiny). For our purposes, we will define intermediate scrutiny applicable to
second order speech in the rigorous manner established in cases like Virginia Pharmacy or
Craig v. Boren.
167. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25, 542 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("A survey of the relevant decisions indicates that the results which we have
reached are on the whole those that would ensue from careful weighing of conflicting inter-
ests."). Of course, when faced with free speech questions, Justice Frankfurter adverted to the
legislature to strike the balance of interests under his theory of judicial restraint. Different
variants of a general balancing of interest test can be found in earlier cases. In American
Communications Ass 'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950), for example, the Court stated the
approach this way: "When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the public order,
and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty
of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater
protection under the particular circumstances presented." The origin of a general balancing
of interest test in free speech may lie in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939), where
the Court observed: "[Tihe delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the cir-
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A second is the Pike balancing test used in Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, which seems somewhat akin to a general balancing-of-interest
test. When a state does not discriminate in commerce between in-state and
out-of-state interests, Pike balancing calls for a weighing of the "burden
imposed on... commerce ... in relation to the putative local benefits."'68 In
short, a general balancing-of-interest test calls for the assessment of two
items on an equal, unweighted scale: speech versus the governmental inter-
est. General balancing differs from weighted balancing in that weighted
balancing evaluates the two items on an uneven, weighted scale; one item is
presumptively preferred over the other. Weighted balancing is the process
used in heightened scrutiny. For strict scrutiny, the rule of law is that core
speech is presumptively determined to be constitutional and immune from
regulation unless the state interest is of overwhelming importance. For in-
termediate scrutiny, the rule of law is that second-order speech will merit
strong constitutional protection and will often survive attempts at regula-
tion, unless the legal measure substantially outweighs the value of the
speech and is substantially related to the end the measure pursues. For a
general balancing-of-interest test, the rule of law is simply weighing the
value of the speech versus the value of the governmental interest; whichever
is weightier wins. There is obviously less predictability to evaluation of
third-order speech as compared to higher-ranked speech. We will need to
rely on the practical judgments made through case law to bring order and
cohesion to third-level forms of speech.
The final form of speech to be evaluated is fourth-level or unprotected
speech. Appropriate to fourth-level speech is rational basis review, which
calls on government to justify its policy choice by demonstrating it is pursu-
ing a rational end that it is rationally related to the pursuit of that end. Ra-
tional basis review is a low, deferential standard of review as seems appro-
priate for unprotected speech. After all, unprotected speech has communica-
tive value, but carries with it the baggage of clear and present dangers.
Because there is harm connected with unprotected speech, government
must prove the elements of harm that make up the definition of the unpro-
cumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regu-
lation of the free enjoyment of the rights."
For careful consideration of balancing approaches to the First Amendment, see
Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
168. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The full statement of the
test is:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effect on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tected category of speech. This is the essence of the categorical ap-
proach-proving why wholesale regulation is merited on account of the
presence of elements that comprise the definition of speech. For example, to
prove sanction of fighting words, government must prove that the commu-
nications under review are "those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizens, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."'69 If government makes out its
case, then it has met its burden of proof and the speech may be regulated.
There is great benefit to this categorical approach-government attention is
focused on the properties of the speech that cause or proximately cause the
harm and not the speech itself. It is akin to the criminal justice system; that
is, government must prove the elements of the unprotected category of
speech like it must prove the elements of a crime. The speech is presump-
tively protected unless government can make out its case for regulation. The
official focus on harm insulates substantially the fundamental right of
speech.
Having laid out these four levels of speech protection in order to bring
coherence to Free Speech, we must also be aware that often times it will be
quite difficult to determine whether speech is protected or not protected and,
if protected, what level of protection it merits-high, medium, low, or min-
imal? For example, is corporate speech used for a political message politi-
cal, commercial, or something else? Now, we would say corporate speech
used for political purposes is protected as core political speech. Is corporate
speech used to promote goods commercial or noncommercial? Is a work of
art, such as a film, painting, poem or book, that depicts sexuality in the con-
text of politics or religion first-order, third-order, or fourth-order speech? Is
it protected or nonprotected? These are just examples of the muddle that can
arise over free speech questions. These questions will be hard to work out.
Thus, I suggest we have a default rule in place to sort out the messiness of
the judgments to be made. The default rule should be: speech should be
protected unless government can make a sufficient case that the activity at
issue does not merit protection as speech. This default rule will essentially
apply the process of a general balancing-of-interest test: weigh the value of
the speech versus the value of the governmental interest, and whichever is
weightier wins. The messiness of these types of cases will have to be sorted
out through case law. Over time, the case law can point the way toward
what level of protection should apply to the category of speech under re-
view.
169. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
1233
Michigan State Law Review
CONCLUSION
To establish and maintain coherence in Free Speech law, it is crucial
that we attend to the architecture of the First Amendment. A focus on struc-
ture and ordering can provide a solid foundation to the complicated nature
of expression law so that it can avoid the dangers of doctrinal confusion and
put in place a ready methodology to solve the inevitable tests brought about
through new social developments. The First Amendment must be equipped
to deal with the changing technologies, mores, and developments of the 21 st
century.
We have seen how critical to the task of maintaining the architecture
are the goals of defining with precision the different categories of speech;
justifying the value of speech according to solid rubrics, such as valuation
of speech and measurement according to the speech/conduct dichotomy;
ordering speech by categories; and assigning levels of scrutiny appropriate
to the valuation of the expression. These principles can establish a certain
predictability and coherence to Free Speech law, thereby forming a founda-
tion that solidifies the Amendment and establishes a base on which to judge
future free speech questions. An architecture of this nature will not, of
course, solve all issues of Free Speech law. None of us possess the presci-
ence or analytical skill to accomplish that quixotic task; but a solid architec-
ture will establish a certain coherence to the law, and coherence is needed to
provide predictability to the law.
Most importantly, coherence in the law will solidify the core of pro-
tected speech, the area most fundamental to our expressive freedoms, by
establishing what is core speech and how it is to be protected. The center is
to be protected at all costs. Whatever future battles are to take place in the
Free Speech wars, we want them to take place at the fringes of the First
Amendment, not at its center.
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